Mathematics: Modern and Ancient

 

© 2007 Aleksandar Kandić

 

Abstract: Albert Einstein proclaimed that as far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality. How much modern conceptions of mathematics differ from the genuine, and would the fathers of the discipline be willing to approve of them? In this paper, I will expose the principal differences between the ordinary (i.e. formal) mathematics, primarily understood as a problem solving apparatus, and, on the other hand, Pythagorean, or universal mathematics - as Descartes is prone to call it - which is genuine ancient mathematics, existing solely to the purpose of discovering, depicting and formulating those principles which underlie experience and physical reality. The differences are so vast that they entirely distort the genuine meaning of the terms such as mathematics, axiom, and related.

 

A careful reader of philosophical literature will certainly notice that the kind of mathematics taught in today’s schools is in many ways different than the one elaborated in famous ancient writings. It is generally accepted that Pythagoras and his followers invented the word “mathematics”, which is derived from the Greek word mathema and primarily means learning, study, science. The Pythagoreans also conceived methods, goals and procedures of the mathematical discipline. They were divided into mathematicians (in ancient Greek, mathematikoi), or those who possess true, systematic knowledge, and listeners - as we could translate the Greek word akusmatikoi - who only transmit information without proper understanding. Since then, mathematics suffered through many changes. From being a science which aims to discover, depict and formulate those principles which underlie experience and reality, the principles of all things, it turned to being a mere play of words and symbols, much more similar to poetry than science. Its laws and principles are considered to be completely abstract and unrelated to physical reality.

        First, I will discuss the modern the view on the nature of mathematics, adequately expressed by the following words of Albert Einstein:

 

...as far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality. (Sidelights on Relativity, Geometry and Experience)[1]

 

Einstein was one of the scientists who questioned the consistency of physical laws, the universality of physical constants. Therefore, it was unacceptable to him that laws and principles which underlie physical reality should be investigated in the same manner as the laws of mathematics. The laws of mathematics are necessary in the most rigorous sense of the word, however, in reality, nothing appears to be absolutely necessary, unchangeable and timeless. I believe Einstein was right to consider physical laws inconsistent, but I also believe he made a crucial mistake when he rejected the possibility of an unchangeable law, or principle, responsible for any kind of change. Such a principle would certainly be mathematical, and physical entity at the same time.

        In a few points, what do the upholders of this view assume? And to which paradoxes they have to commit themselves?

        (1) There are no unchangeable, necessary aspects of physical reality, and, therefore, the concept of physical law is not rigorous at all. Since the laws of mathematics express certain necessary, universal truths, there is no way they could relate to physical reality.

        (2) Mathematical entities cannot be experienced through physical senses. Instead, they are considered to be mere constructions of the human mind. As a consequence, we are forced to believe that mathematical entities reside in a completely different realm than the one displayed to our senses.

        (3) Points (1) and (2) inevitably lead to the so-called two worlds paradox. The relation between mathematical, unchangeable entities and sensible things remains unexplained and completely obscure. These two classes of objects inhabit two distinct worlds. Some commentators have unreasonably accused Plato of committing himself to this paradox, but his “theory of Forms”[2] was actually an ambitious (and most probably, successful) attempt to explain this relation between mathematical and sensible entities.

        Being that modern mathematicians do not even try to solve this paradox, they have to represent it as nonsensical in certain way. So, they escape to formalism. Mathematical entities become nothing but mere symbols, completely deprived of their reality and meaning. For example, David Hilbert gave much support to formalistic conception of mathematics. In such mathematics, we are allowed to define symbols, operations, rules of derivation, etc. in such a manner that they need not refer to any real, existing objects. All that matters is that the internal coherence of formal system is achieved. It’s a closed system. And it really is difficult not to compare such mathematics to science-fiction, or poetry, simply because it doesn’t even try to have some explanatory, scientific value. It finds its application in technology, arts and empirical sciences only as some kind of modeling device, a problem solving apparatus.

        Now, let’s turn to the second view which represents the genuine conception of mathematics, usually ascribed to Pythagorean mathematicians. Aristotle writes:

 

...the Pythagoreans, as they are called, devoted themselves to mathematics; they were the first to advance this study, and having been brought up in it they thought its principles were the principles of all things. (Metaphysics, 985b)

 

And these words of Plato add up nicely:

 

Geometry is the knowledge of that which always is, and not of a something which at some time comes into being and passes away. (The Republic, 527b)

 

As we all know, for ancient Greeks mathematics was primarily geometry. They didn’t use algebra, or symbolic representation. Instead, they literally draw their proofs, they represented them visually. Euclid’s Elements set a perfect example. Of course, this had some disadvantages of purely practical nature, but in my opinion, it made a much more immediate, much more efficient approach to mathematical studies.

        What beliefs could be attributed to the upholders of this view?

        (1) Contrary to the modern conception of mathematics we have just discussed, there should be certain unchanging, immovable and timeless aspects of physical reality which constitute the proper object of mathematical studies, and thus, receive the name of “mathematical entities”. If such entities didn’t exist in reality, we wouldn’t be able to conceive them in our minds. Furthermore, their relationship to sensible things is that of cause to effect.

        (2) Mathematical entities are not mere constructions of the human mind. Instead, they are abstracted from experience. For example, mathematical entities could be some elemental, simple things which combine into sensible, physical objects.

        (3) By abstraction, by observation and constant reexamination of sensory data, the mind dicovers mathematical entities and the first principles of reality. Then, it is able to deduce all the facts about world beginning from these first principles, which have to be some kind of patterns encompassing all possibilities. That makes them universal laws.

        Clearly, the modern and the ancient view on the nature of mathematics seem to be opposite in many ways. While the concept of axiom is rather loose in contemporary mathematics, which means that certain propositions are considered to be axiomatic only by convention, by agreement among mathematicians, in ancient, Pythagorean mathematics axioms are supposed to symbolically express objective realities, things which are necessary not in our opinion but by themselves and thus constitute the fundamental principles of reality. Axioms might be understood as the building blocks of reality, the elements which cannot be decomposed into smaller elements but combine in order to produce any imaginable shape, or possibility.

        What things might be proper candidates for the status of axioms? According to Descartes, who expressed fascination with ancient, or universal mathematics – as he tends to call it – in his early epistemological treatises, the subject of mathematics should be certain relationships and proportions abstracted from sensible objects. Descartes writes:

 

But as I considered the matter carefully it gradually came to light that all those matters only were referred to mathematics in which order and measurement are investigated, and that it makes no difference whether it be in numbers, figures, stars, sounds or any other object that the question of measurement arises. (Rules, p. 7)

 

Then, in Discourse on Method, he continues:

 

I had no intention of trying to master all those particular sciences that receive in common the name of mathematics; but observing that, although their objects are different, they do not fail to agree in this, that they take nothing under consideration but the various relationships and proportions which are present in these objects, I thought that it would be better if I only examined these proportions in their general aspect. (Discourse on Method, p. 47)

 

This philosophical language is familiar to any reader of Plato’s Timaeus, in which the structure of the so-called “world-soul” is explained according to musical ratios[3].

        In conclusion, the word “mathematics” has received a very different meaning than it used to have in ancient times. Of particular interest would be to observe and affect the future developments in mathematics. I believe there still exists a chance to bring back the glory mathematics used to have, to return to those concepts which made it so special and powerful after all. One of the primary goals should be the reconciliation of formalism and realism, as well as the clarification of the role of symbolic representation. We should not take sides, as I did in this paper. Instead, we should follow the middle path, incline towards some kind of fusion between ancient science and modern mathematics, modern information technologies, etc. And of course, we mustn’t forget the psychological, cathartic dimensions of mathematics which were so important to Pythagoreans and Platonists. The understanding of the fundamental principles of reality leads to self-improvement, bliss, and liberates us from many fears which might arise out of ignorance of such principles. So, in my opinion, the goal of mathematician is to see the unfolding of time and worldly events as some kind of logico-deductive structure and to increase the certainty of his predictions, being aware that they could never become absolutely certain.

 

References

 

Aristotle: Metaphysics in Barnes, Jonathan (ed.): The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. 2;

(Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey 1984), p.1559

Barker, Stefan: Filozofija matematike; (Nolit, Beograd 1973), pp.166-170 and pp.176-180

Descartes, René: Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason in Great

Books of the Western World, Vol. 31; (The University of Chicago, Chicago 1952), p.47

Descartes, René: Rules for the Direction of the Mind in Great Books of the Western

World, Vol. 31; (The University of Chicago, Chicago 1952), p.7

Einstein, Albert: Sidelights on Relativity;

http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext05/slrtv10.txt

(20.10.2007.)

Kandić, Aleksandar: Dekartov projekat univerzalne matematike;

http://frag005.com/dekartov-projekat.htm

(30.05.2007.)

Kandić, Aleksandar: Mathematics as a Science of Reality: Pyhtagoras, Plato, Descartes;

http://frag005.com/mathematics-athens.htm

(22.07.2007.)

Plato: The Republic in Hamilton, Edith and Cairns, Huntington (ed.): The Collected Dialogues of

Plato; (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey 1989), p.759

Plato: Timaeus in Hamilton, Edith and Cairns, Huntington (ed.): The Collected Dialogues of Plato;

(Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey 1989), pp.1165-1166



[1] Address to the Prussian Academy of Sciences in Berlin on January 27th, 1921. Published in Sidelights on Relativity, under the title Geometry and Experience.

[2] It ought to be said that Plato himself never used the expression “theory of Forms”.

[3] See Plato: Timaeus,  34c-36e